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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The general issue of the future ownership of farmland is one that 
has received considerable recent attention in both the popular and 
professional literature. One particular aspect of the ownership 
question concerns the future size distribution of farms. At issue 
is the question of whether or not the recently observed trend to 
greater concentration in farming can be expected to continue. A long 
promulgated policy of the United States government has been the 
preservation of the so-called "family farm". The concentration trend 
in farming has led to a critical appraisal of whether or not this 
policy remains feasible. Concern also exists for the possible 
future relationship between farm ownership and farm operation. 
Particular issues in this regard deal with whether or not the 
ownership of farmland might become vested in nonfarm individuals, non-
farm corporations, or nonresident alien investors. This absentee land­
lord issue is also seen to threaten the viability of "family farming". 
The legal restrictions imposed by many states on farm ownership by 
corporations and nonresident aliens (Morrison and Krause, 1975) and 
those portions of the Congressional Foreign Investment Study Act of 
1974 dealing with farming indicate the nature and extent of public 
concern. More generally, the future character of the United States 
rural landscape, including both farming and the delivery of 
ancillary services by towns, depends largely on the future ownership 
structure of farmland. 
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It is plausible to expect that, in the absence of effective 
statutory restrictions, the future ownership of farmland will be 
vested in those individuals or corporations that are currently in a 
position to offer the highest bid per acre of land. A useful approach 
to the farm ownership issue, then, becomes one of: (a) isolating those 
factors which are significant in determining an investor's valuation 
of farmland, and (b) bringing these factors together into a 
comprehensive model explaining the determination of an investor's 
maximum bid for an acre of farmland. Such a model should be designed 
to relate an investor's maximum per-acre bid to the particular charac­
teristics of his own circumstances and the land under consideration. 
If these characteristics can be defined in terms of the variables of the 
model, it can be employed to compare the relative bidding potentials of 
various investors or types of investors for any kind of farmland. 
This kind of empirical investigation would serve as a useful first 
approximation in a consideration of the future ownership issue. 
The purpose of this study is to provide a general framework for 
the determination of the maximum bid prices for an acre of farmland 
of particular investors or investor types, and to conduct some pre­
liminary tests of the importance of various factors in the determina­
tion of relative bidding potentials for farmland. Chapter II examines 
previous research related to the ownership question. A theoretical 
maximum bid-price model is presented in Chapter III, and a numerical 
specification of the model is provided in Chapter IV. Finally, the 
model is evaluated and the study is summarized in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter presents a review of recent literature pertinent to 
the development of a maximum bid-price model. The literature on 
agricultural land valuation provides two ingredients essential to this 
study: (a) a catalogue of variables that have been shown to be im­
portant in land pricing, and (b) the examples of previous efforts in 
the construction of bid-price models. Three broad areas of research 
are discussed in this review because of their relevance to the future 
ownership question; 
1. Statistical studies on farmland valuation. 
2. General investigations pertaining to the firm-size structure 
of the farming industry. 
3. Previous versions of maximum bid-price models. 
Statistical Studies 
Reynolds and Timmons (1959) provide a recent and comprehensive 
example of a great deal of the econometric research that has been 
directed to the issue of farmland values.^ Their research was 
prompted by the observation that, since the early 1950's, increases 
in farmland values have outpaced the growth of net farm income. 
Theirs was an attempt to explain, by means of an econometric model, 
^The volume of statistical land value studies is prodigious. A 
good summary of this literature can be found in Walker (1976). 
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that portion of the increase in farmland values not explained by 
changes in net farm income over the period 1933 to 1965. 
Reynolds and Timmons identified what they believed to be the 
important factors influencing farmland values and estimated the 
impacts of these variables. The variables which they found to be 
significant (most at the 5 percent level or better) in explaining 
farmland values over the period were; expected net farm income, 
government payments for land diversion, conservation payments, 
expected capital gains, farm enlargement, nonfarm population density, 
technological advance, the ratio of debt to equity, voluntary transfers 
of farmland, the capitalization rate, and the expected ratio of 
farm-to-nonfarm earnings. 
While the results of the work of Reynolds and Timmons are 
informative in terms of many of the variables identified, their study 
offers no insight into individual choice theory. Their study is an 
ex post summarization of the operation of an entire market - the 
market for United States farmland.^ Although the Reynolds and Timmons 
study is a thorough investigation of the results of the operation of 
the farmland market over an extensive time period, it does not analyze, 
at a single point in time, the process that might lead to those re­
sults. As such, not all of the variables identified by Reynolds and 
Timmons are relevant in an individual choice theoretic framework, 
e.g., nonfarm population density or voluntary transfers of farmland. 
^The values for the variables used in their regression analysis 
were the annual United States averages for each variable for each 
year in the time series. 
5 
Further, a regression analysis contributes to the comprehension 
of why farmland has been traded at certain prices, regardless of 
who paid those prices. For an analysis of the farm ownership is­
sue however, it is necessary to develop a comparison of the willingness 
of various investors to own farmland as represented by the price each 
would offer. The farmland values that have prevailed are presumably 
related to the demands of the highest bidder in any particular 
market. A more comprehensive model would contribute to the under­
standing of the factors causing that particular investor to be the 
successful purchaser vis ^  vis his competitors. 
Studies on the Firm-Size Structure 
of the Farming Industry 
The question of the future firm-size structure of the farming 
industry has developed what is perhaps the most voluminous popular 
and research literature of any area related to the future farm owner­
ship issue. This volume is due possibly to the emotionally charged 
implications of this issue, particularly with reference to the viability 
of the "family farm". 
In two separate studies, Krause and Kyle (1970, 1971) analyze 
various incentives to the formation of large farming units. Arm­
strong (1969) also identifies several sources of advantage to the 
acquisition of large farms. Most of the factors identified by these 
three studies as contributing to the attractiveness of larger 
farming units fall under the categories of ; technical economies in 
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production, pecuniary economies, subsidies and tax rates, managerial 
talent, nonfarm investment, specialization, and conglomeration. 
Whereas all of these factors are pertinent to an investor 
decision model, the three studies mentioned do not integrate them into 
a single, comprehensive framework to evaluate the relative bidding 
potentials of small versus large farm operators. The first study 
by Krause and Kyle (1970) and the work of Armstrong serve primarily 
to indicate the factors that impinge differentially on various farm-
size classes. Both studies suggest the need for further research 
to analyze these factors. 
The second contribution by Krause and Kyle (1971) does offer 
much more in terms of the quantification and integration of several of 
the advantages and disadvantages of large versus small farm operations. 
Their comparisons are couched in terms of the differing rates of 
return on investment obtained under various farm sizes (500, 1,000, 
2,000, and 5,000 acres) considering the influence of such factors 
as technical economies, buying and selling advantages, federal 
income tax rates, and equity levels. A summary of a portion of the 
results is presented in Table 2.1. 
The results of Krause and Kyle are a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of the incentives to various types of ownership. How­
ever, they are not translated into a comparison of different bidding 
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Table 2.1. Rate of return on investment after federal income tax 
costs considered at three equity levels on corn pro­
duction units of four sizes, Corn Belt, 1969-70^ 
Rate of return on investment 
Percentage of after federal income taxes 
equity in the for units of; 
business 500 1,000 2,000 5,000 
acres acres acres acres 
100% 5.2% 6.0% 4.9% 5.2% 
60% 5.0% 5.9% 5.6% 6.1% 
30% 4.0% 6.0% 7.8% 8.3% 
^Source: Krause and Kyle (1971), Table 17, p. 28. 
potentials by the various size and equity classes-^ Thus, no 
specific or quantitative implications with respect to the future owner­
ship of farmland can be drawn from the Krause and Kyle comparisons of 
rates of return on investment. An evaluation of the ownership question 
requires a model to translate the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of various investor classes into a measure of the willingness of the 
different investors to purchase farmland. It is this translation 
that is the subject of maximum bid-price models. 
Indeed, differences in rates of return cannot directly be con­
verted into differences in bid prices unless the investor is risk 
neutral. 
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Previous Versions of Bid-Price 
Models 
The first maximum bid-price model for farmland was developed by 
Harris and Nehring (1976) in response to the lack of a theoretical 
framework capable of comparing the land purchasing potentials of 
various investors, particularly with reference to farm-size dif­
ferences. In follow-up research, Harris and Hampel (1976) 
developed a model to evaluate foreign versus domestic bidding 
potentials. The Harris and Nehring model offers important insights 
into the construction of a maximum bid-price model, and the Harris 
and Hampel research extends the scope of the analysis. However, the 
former study is somewhat limited in its applicability, while both 
models encounter some difficulties because of the particular form 
of their specification. 
The Harris and Nehring model has as its genesis the work of 
Pratt (1964). In his formulation of a measure of the degree of risk 
aversion, Pratt defines the bid price as the largest amount a 
decision maker would willingly pay to obtain a risky asset. This 
bid price is given by the equation 
u(x)= E [ U ( X + Z - B ) ( 2 . 1 )  
where x represents the level of assets held by the decision maker; 
Variables that appear with a tilde are used to denote random 
variables, i.e., those whose future values are not known with 
certainty. 
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u, his utility function; E, the expected value operator; z, the 
risky asset; and B, the bid price.^ Equation 2,1 establishes the 
behavioral assumption that the decision maker will pay a price for 
a risky asset such that the expected utility of his resulting wealth 
position is no less than the utility of his original wealth position 
which did not include the risky asset. In the Harris and Nehring 
analysis, x is interpreted as the certain level of net worth of the 
decision maker and z as a random variable denoting the value of an 
acre of land. Thus the bid price B is the maximum amount, consistent 
with the utility level associated with his original wealth position, 
that the investor would be willing to pay for an acre of land. 
From Equation 2.1, Harris and Nehring develop an equation 
capable of analyzing the impacts of the following variables on bid 
price: the investor's degree of risk aversion, the expected value and 
variance of per-acre land income, the expected rate of growth of 
land income, the marginal income tax rate of the decision maker, 
and the investor's rate of pure time preference. The variables 
included in this analysis are a function largely of the intended use 
of the model, i.e., a comparison of the bidding potentials of 
various farm-size classes. As such, the application of this model is 
essentially limited to the calculation of maximum bid prices of 
farm operators. 
^Equation 2.1 is as it appears in Harris and Nehring (1976). 
The variable B is equivalent to TTj^ in Pratt's notation. 
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Although the Harris and Nehring model has certain deficiencies, 
the technique they derive to compare bidding potentials is an im­
portant contribution to the literature on the relationship between 
farm size and farm ownership. The nature of this contribution may 
best be noted by a comparison of their results with the results of 
other studies. A portion of the Harris and Nehring results is 
presented in Table 2.2. The numbers in rows 1 through 5 appear in 
a numerical example of the bid-price model provided by Harris and 
Nehring. Rows 7 and 8 were computed for the purpose of comparing 
the bid-price results with those of the previously discussed study by 
Krause and Kyle (1971). Row 7 roughly corresponds to the type of 
farm-size comparison made by Krause and Kyle as presented in Table 
2.1, although the units of measurement differ. While Krause and 
Kyle computed after tax rates of return on investment for various 
farm sizes, row 7 presents data on the after-tax net income per 
acre of various farm size classes. Row 8 is computed by considering 
after-tax income per acre (row 7) as a growing annual income stream, 
and finding the present value of that stream using the same 
discount and expected growth rates as used in the bid-price model. 
Thus, row 8 may be interpreted as representing the bidding potential 
comparison over farm sizes that can be directly inferred from 
studies such as the one conducted by Krause and Kyle. A comparison 
of row 6 (bid price computed using the Harris and Nehring model) and 
row 8 (bid price imputed directly from studies reporting rates 
Table 2.2. Partial summary of the numerical example in Harris and Nehring (1976) 
Farm Class II III IV 
(1) Average Farm Size (acres) 1,307 
(2) Net Income Per Acre $36.18 
(3) Marginal Tax Rate 43% 
(4) Discount Rate .09082 
(5) Expected Growth Rate .04387 
(6) Per-Acre Bid Price $429 
(7) After-Tax Income Per Acre^ $20.62 
(8) Present Value of After-Tax Net 
Income Per Acre $439 
630 
$39.16 
32% 
.09082 
.04387 
$533 
$26.62 
$567 
390 
$33.95 
28% 
.09082 
.04387 
$485 
$24.44 
$521 
254 
$26.67 
25% 
.09082 
.04387 
$403 
$20.00 
$426 
170 
$19.04 
24% 
.09082 
,04387 
$231 
$14.47 
$308 
^Rows 1-6 appear in the Harris and Nehring study. 
^Rows 7 and 8 were computed for this study. 
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of return) indicates the usefulness of maximum bid-price models. 
The particular form of the utility function employed in the 
numerical example provided by Harris and Nehring exhibits decreasing 
risk aversion over wealth. Thus the greater degree of risk aversion 
characteristic of operators of small as opposed to large farms leads 
to a comparison of bidding potentials in row 6 which differs from 
that of row 8. The results of the bid-price model indicate a greater 
difference in the bidding potentials of small versus large farm 
operators than is the case when the different income streams are 
simply discounted. The ratio of the bids of the largest to the 
smallest farm size class in the Harris and Nehring example (row 5) 
is 1.86. The corresponding ratio for the bids imputed directly from 
the different after-tax income streams (row 8) is 1.42. However, 
the Harris and Nehring bid-price model is not initially formulated 
in terms of any specific utility function. Any type of risk aversion 
may be incorporated into an empirical specification of the model by 
using the appropriate utility function. If constant risk aversion 
over wealth had been assumed in the construction of the numerical 
example, rows 6 and 8 would have given similar bid-price comparisons. 
The use of a bid-price model to compare the willingness of 
investors to purchase title to different income streams involves the 
recognition of an important consideration. That is, the transition 
from different rates of return on investment or net dollar returns 
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per acre to bid prices requires more than simply discounting the 
different income streams- Simple discounting does not take account 
of either; (a) the different risks associated with the different 
income streams, or (b) the different treatment accorded to risk by 
various investors. If the present value calculations of several types 
of investors were to be used to compare bidding potentials, a variety 
of discount rates reflecting risk considerations would have to be 
employed. This would require a separate model to determine the 
discount rates. However, a bid-price model operates in the context 
of utility maximization, and thereby can take account of such factors 
as risk aversion in evaluating different income streams. 
As a first attempt at the development of a maximum bid-price 
model for farmland, the work by Harris and Nehring suffers certain 
important deficiencies. The model, as developed, is applicable only 
to comparisons of the bidding potentials of different farm operators. 
A more general approach to the future ownership question should be 
capable of considering a wider variety of potential investors in the 
market for farmland. Krause and Kyle (1970) suggest that conglomera­
tion is a possible incentive for the acquisition of,farming units 
by nonfarm operators, or at least by farming firms engaged also in 
nonfarm enterprises. Thus, the implications to the investor of the 
possible advantages of diversification resulting from the purchase 
of farmland should be considered in a more general model. 
The model developed by Harris and Hampel reflects an attempt to 
generalize on the work of Harris and Nehring by incorporating the 
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aspect of portfolio diversification. The particular context of this 
study involves an attempt to compare the bidding potentials of foreign 
and domestic bidders for United States farmland. Since the inclusion 
of foreign bidders raises the possibility of nonfarm investors 
bidding for farmland, this second bid-price model takes explicit 
account of the role of diversification in the formation of an 
investor's maximum bid. 
Harris and Hampel specify their bid-price model with the 
equation 
E[u(x+v)] = E[u(x+v+z-B)]. (2.2) 
where E, u, z, and B are as defined in the Harris and Nehring model; 
X represents the beginning-of-period net worth of the decision 
maker; and v is the random dollar change in this net worth position 
over the period. The left hand side of the equation represents the 
utility the individual expects to derive from his original portfolio. 
The right hand side shows the decision maker's expected utility 
position if an acre of land has been added to his portfolio at the 
price B. The interpretation of Equation 2.2 is analogous to that of 
Equation 2.1. 
Both of the bid-price models have shortcomings in the treatment 
of the financing of land purchases. In the Harris and Nehring study, 
land is paid for by drawing down the investor's assets. The level of 
the investor's assets is assumed to be certain. Further, since a 
rate of pure time preference is employed to determine the investor's 
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expectation with respect to the value of an acre of land, no oppor­
tunity cost in the form of alternate return on assets is considered 
in the determination of a maximum bid price. 
By incorporating the role of portfolio diversification in 
their model, Harris and Hampe1 avoid the unrealistic assumption of a 
certain level of investor assets. However, the specification of 
Equation 2.2 implies that the investor will not alter his original 
portfolio when he purchases land at the price B, if his bid is 
accepted. The value of the investor's portfolio at the end of the 
period is represented by (x+v) in this equation. This term appears 
on both sides of Equation 2.2. Under this specification, it must be 
implicitly assumed that the amount paid to acquire land comes out of 
some cash fund such that the original portfolio is not altered. 
Although there are various possible ways for a bid-price model to 
treat the financing of land purchases, a more reasonable approach 
would be to specify the model in such a way that the investor is 
seen as liquidating a cross section of his original portfolio in 
order to add the new land asset. 
A second problem with both the Harris and Nehring and Harris 
and Hampel models lies in the treatment of the marginal income tax 
rate. In both models, the expected value of an acre of land is 
defined by the equation 
E(5) = 7^^ E(y) (2.3) (i-g) 
where t is the investor's marginal income tax rate; E(y), expected net 
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farm income per acre; i, the decision maker's discount rate for 
pure time preference; and g, the expected rate of growth of after 
tax income. Both models, by recourse to Equation 2.3, lead to the 
conclusion that wealthy investors suffer a bidding disadvantage due 
to the progressivité of federal income tax rates. 
Ignoring the complicating factor of the expected growth rate, g, 
Adams (1976) has shown that the appropriate method for discounting 
the perpetual income stream afforded by land ownership should be given 
by 
E® •  (2 .4 )  
l(i-t) 1 
In Adams' version of the discounting equation, the tax rate cancels; 
and hence larger bidders should not be at a disadvantage because 
of a progressive tax-rate schedule. Although a higher income 
bidder will probably be subject to a greater marginal tax rate than 
his smaller competitors, the income generating opportunities he forgoes 
in order to acquire land would also have been taxed at the same 
higher rate. The use of Equation 2.3 implies that the investor's 
opportunity costs of land return are not taxed. That is only the case 
of investor's whose entire portfolios are held in the form of tax-
exempt municipal bonds or cash. Thus, as Adams demonstrates, except 
in the case of wealth owners who hold a portion of their port­
folios in the form of municipals, different tax rates should not 
act as a source of differentiation in bid-price potentials. 
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Summary 
Statistical land value studies suggest the variables that are 
important in land valuation. However, these studies are ex post 
descriptions of entire markets. As such, not all of the variables 
identified in econometric research on land valuation are applicable 
to an investor decision model. Research in the area of farm size 
provides insight into the different sources of incentive to owner­
ship by various farm-size classes. However, this type of research 
does not integrate these incentives into a measure of the willingness 
to purchase farmland. Harris and Nehring have provided a maximum 
bid-price model to translate the various incentives to ownership 
among farm-size classes into bid prices. Harris and Hampe1 have 
extended the analysis to include a wider range of investor types. 
However, these bid-price models require unusual assumptions with 
respect to the financing of land purchases, and err in the treatment 
of tax rates. 
A respecification of the form of the bid-price model avoids both 
of the problems of the previous models. In the next chapter, a 
maximum bid-price model is constructed in such a way that: (a) 
the investor is assumed to finance land purchases by the 
liquidation of a cross section of his original portfolio, and (b) 
the taxation of the investor's original portfolio income is accounted 
for. This second procedure is consistent with the observations of 
Adams. 
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CHAPTER III. A MAXIMUM BiD-PRICE MODEL 
FOR FARMLAND 
This chapter presents a general model for determining the maximum 
bid price that an investor would pay for an acre of land, i analysis 
of the comparative statics of the model, and some comments about the 
model relative to the existing literature. 
The bid price will be expressed as a function of several important 
characteristics of both the investor and the land under consideration. 
Such a model could therefore be used: (a) to compare the relative 
bidding potentials of several investors or investor types for a given 
type of land, (b) to compare the different bids of a single investor 
for various land groupings, or (c) to provide a set of comparisons of 
bidding potential of several investors over various land types. The 
investor and land characteristics to be incorproated in the model 
include: (a) the investor's initial net worth position, (b) the 
investor's expected return on original portfolio, (c> the investor's 
expected net return per acre of land, (d) measures of the riskiness 
of land income and portfolio return, (e) the implications of the 
relationship between portfolio return and land income on portfolio 
diversification, (f) the investor's degree of risk aversion, and 
(g) the investor's marginal income tax rate-
19 
The Model 
The construction of the model involves comparing the decision 
maker's expectation of utility from income derived from original 
portfolio with the utility he can expect to derive from portfolio 
income if a portion of the original portfolio has been replaced by 
land. The after-tax income per period from original portfolio may 
be written as 
xk(l-t) (3.1) 
where x represents the certain level of the investors assets at the 
beginning of the period; k, the random percentage return on original 
portfolio per period (this return is a composite of both income 
return and capital gains) and t, the decision maker's marginal 
income tax rate. If the decision maker were to purchase an acre of 
land by liquidating a cross section of his original portfolio, the 
after-tax return per period would appear as 
[(x-b)k + y](1-t) (3.2) 
where b represents the purchase price of an acre of land, and y is the 
random net dollar return per period derived from an acre of land (this 
return also includes capital gains). 
Equating the expected utilities of 3.1 and 3.2 results in an 
expression for the maximum bid price B the investor would willingly 
offer for an acre of land: 
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E{u[xk(l-t) ]} = E[u{[(x-B)k + y](l-t)}] (3.3) 
where E denotes the expected value operator and u, the investor's 
utility function. 
Equation 3.3 represents the equality of the expected utilities 
of the single-period return of the investor's two alternatives, 
i.e., with or without the land acquisition. In the more general 
multi-period case, if the two single-period returns are treated as 
periodic returns in perpetuity, the two expected utilities would be 
discounted by a risk free rate of pure time preference. The same 
risk free rate would be used for both streams since the utility 
function takes account of risk. The utility function converts the 
two combinations of risk and return into comparable magnitudes, the 
expected utilities. Therefore, the streams to be discounted would 
consist of the periodic expected utilities rather than the periodic 
returns. The investor is seen as discounting two perpetual streams 
of risk-adjusted expected utilities by a risk-free rate rather than 
discounting two income streams by a risk-adjusted rate. 
The investor's maximum bid price for the multi-period case 
is thus given by 
E{u[xk(l-t) ]} _ E[u{[(x-B)k + y] (1-t)}] ^ 
i i 
where i represents the investor's risk-free discount rate for pure 
time preference. However, since the discount rates cancel, the 
specification of the single-period case in Equation 3.3 is general. 
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This formulation does not explicitly take account of liquidity 
considerations. One of two assumptions must therefore be made: (a) 
liquidity considerations are not important to the investor, or perhaps 
more plausibly, (b) the liquidity of a cross section of the original 
portfolio is sufficiently similar to that of a cross section of the 
new portfolio with land added to make liquidity differences un­
important. 
Although Equation 3.3 is specified in terms of periodic returns 
rather than the dollar value of the investor's net worth as was 
the case in the previous bid-price models, the interpretation of 
Equation 3.3 is similar to that of Equations 2.1 and 2.2. The 
maximum bid price, B, represents the greatest amount a decision maker 
could pay for an acre of land while maintaining the expected utility 
level associated with his original portfolio. The present specifi­
cation, however., incorporates the taxation of the investor's income 
from original portfolio. This leads to results consistent with the 
observations of Adams (1975). 
In order to solve for an approximation of the maximum bid price, 
the function u is expanded around xk(l-t) by a Taylor expansion 
(Yamane, 1968, pp. 280-281) on both sides of Equation 3.3. The 
use of the Taylor expansion requires that B is small relative to x. 
Performing the expected value operation, this procedure results in 
the quadratic equation: 
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|(l-t)u"(a)E(k^)B2 
- {îôi* (a) - (1-t) u" (a) [E (ky)+xE (ic^)-xk^] }B 
-'r j(l-t)u" (a) [E(y^ )+2xE(ky)-2xky] + yu'(a) = 0. (3.5) 
where a = xk{l-t) is the center of the Taylor expansion; u'(a) and 
u"(a) are the first and second derivatives of the utility frunction; 
and k and y are the expected values of original portfolio return and 
per-acre net land income respectively. 
Pratt (1954) has defined a measure of an investor's local degree 
of risk aversion as 
r'a' = - Mw '3-61 
This measure of the degree of risk aversion may be incorporated into 
the model by dividing both sides of Equation 3.5 by -u'(a) to give 
|(l-t)r(a)E(k2)B^ 
+ {k-(l-t)r(a) [E(yk) + xE (k^)-xk^] }B 
+ |(l-t)r(a) [E(y^) + 2xE(ky) - 2xi^]-y = 0 (3.7) 
The solution of this equation would result in an expression for 
— — ~ 2 ~ 2 ~ 
B in terms of t, r(a), k, y, x, E(k ), E(y ) and E(yk). However, in 
order to make the model more meaningful to the decision making process, 
the last three of these variables may first be transformed. 
Substituting the identities 
23 
E(k^) = (3.8) 
E(y^) = and (3.9) 
E(ky) = + ky (3.10) 
into Equation 3.7 and simplifying results in 
^(l-t)r(a) (cr^^+k^)B^ 
+ Ik-(l-t)r(a) (pa a +ky + xO.^)]B 
K y K 
+ ^ ^l-t)r(a)(0y^+y^+2xp0^ay)-y = 0 (3.11) 
2 2 
where and represent the variances of original portfolio return 
and net per-acre land income respectively; O, and a , the corresponding 
K. y 
standard deviations; and p, the correlation coefficient between 
original portfolio return and net per-acre land income. 
The solution of this quadratic equation yields the expressions; 
k 
(l-t)r(a) (Qj^^+k^) 
^ Ck^+2(l-t)r(a)(i) + (l-t)^r(a) ^ 9 ] ^  (3.12a) 
(l-t)r(a)(G^^+k^) 
for r(a) / 0.^ 
Since the bid price is defined as the largest amount a decision 
maker would willingly pay for a risky asset, the solution value for Bin 
in Equation 3.12a requires selection of the positive square root. 
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B = ^ for r(a) = 0. (3.12b) 
k 
where 
(t> = 0^^(y-xk)-kpa^0y (3.13) 
6 = ( p^-1) a^^ay^+x^G^'^+2 (y-xk) 
+ (2kyx-y^)a^^-0^^k^. (3.14) 
The maximum bid price B is now defined in terms of the preferences 
of the decision maker (through the measure of the degree of risk 
aversion, r(a)); the expected value and variance of return on the 
— 2 investor's original portfolio, k and ; the expected value and 
— 2 
variance of per-acre net farm income, y and ; the correlation 
coefficient between portfolio return and land income, p; the 
investor's beginning net worth, x; and the investor's marginal income 
tax rate, t. Specification of the values of these variables allows 
the calculation of the maximum bid price for an acre of farmland of 
any potential investor.^ 
Although the expression 3.12a leads to the determination of an 
investor's maximum bid for a single acre of land, larger acreages 
may be considered by multiplying y and O by the appropriate number 
of acres. ^ 
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Comparative Statics 
The actual values of the variables in the bid-price Equation 
3.12 are related to the land itself and the characteristics, capa­
bilities, and expectations of the specific decision maker in 
question. A qualitative evaluation of the influence of these 
variables on the maximum bid price for an acre of land can be 
carried out by taking the partial derivatives of B with respect 
to y, a , p, r(a), O , k, t and x. Thus, 
^ 1 
D^k+a ^+(l-t) r (a) [per a k+a^ (kx-y) ] 
— = ^ <0 (3.15) 
2  2 - 2  
where D = k^ + 2(l-t)r(a)$ + (1-t)^r(a)^9.^ 
The sign of 9B/9y is indeterminate unless the assumption is 
made that 
kx-y >0 (3.16) 
in which case 9B/9y is positive in sign. Inequality 3.16 represents 
the difference between total expected portfolio return per period 
and expected net per acre land income per period. Since it was 
assumed that x is large relative to B in order to take a Taylor 
expansion, the assumption in 3.16 is plausible. 
Requiring the solution for B cO be real causes the sign of D to 
be positive. Further (j> and 0 are defined by Equations 3.13 and 3.14 
respectively. 
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SB (3.17) 
9a i_ 
• D^(a^^+k^) 
(l-t)r(a)[(p^-l)a^^0y+p0^k(y-xk)-ayk^] ^ 
? 2 —? 
0/(0^ +k^) 
Assuming 3.16, the sign of 3b/90^ hinges on the signs of p and 
1/2 — (D -k). Under reasonable assumptions about the sizes of the 
variables in the model, it may be concluded that 
(CF-k) < 0.^ (3.18) 
Thus, assuming 3.16 and 3.18, the sign of 9B/3(7 is negative. 
1 ^ 
0-3 (D^-k) + (l-t)r(a) (k(y-xk)+pa a ) 
I - Î ° 
The assumptions in 3.16 and 3.18 contribute to the possibility that 
9B/9P is negative in sign. However, even under these assumptions, 
9B/9P is ambiguous. 
SB _ (k-pZ) 4+(l-t)r(a)8 > 20) 
Dr (a) (0%^+k ) 
1 1/2 — 2 9 
D will be less than k if 2(l-t)r(a)(fi + (1-t) r(a) 0 < 0. 
If 0<p^l, then (j)<0. The sign of 0 is indeterminate; however, 
r(a)^ is very small. Thus, 0£.P£1 and r(a)2 is sufficiently small, 
then (D^/^-k) < 0. 
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Under the Assumption 3.18, the sign of the first term in 9B/3r(a) 
is positive and that of the second term is negative. 
gg P% (xk-y) 
1 1 
—  2  1  ~ 2  2 — 2  
20 (k-D^) + ^  ^9D/8a, (a, +k^) . 
+ — 2^ 1 <0. (3.21) 
(l-t)r(a)(G^^+k^) 
where 
3D 
= 2(i-t)r(a){20^(y-xk)-kp0y 
+ (l-t)r(a)[a^X2x^0^^+(p^-l)ay^+2k yx-y^) 
+ pa k(y-xk)]} 
y 
The sign of Bd/SQJ^ is indeterminate. However, all other terms in 
9B/3a^ are positive under Assumptions 3.16 and 3.18, increasing 
the possibility that 9b/90, is positive in sign.^ 
9b (y-2xk) -^^-2pa^Gyk |d ^9D/9k-l 
9k (l-t)r(a) (a. W) 
• 1 
(k-D^) (r' (a)x(l-t) (a^+k^)+2r(a)k) 
+ - 2 2 -2 2 < 0 (3.22) 
(l-t)r(a)^(a%k^) 
1 — 
This of course assumes that expected portfolio return, k, is 
greater than its standard deviation, 
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where 
— = 2{k+(l-t)^r' (a)x((})+(l-t)r (a)0) 
3k 
+ (l-t)r(a) [(l-t)r(a) (pa a (y-2xk) + yxa,^-a \) 
K y K y 
The sign of 9D/3k is indeterminate. The first term of 3B/3k 
is negative in sign by Assumption 3.16, the second is indeterminate, 
and the sign of the last term depends on the sign of r'(a)- Given 
Assumption 3.18, the sign of the third term of Equation 3.22 is 
indeterminate or positive according to whether r'(a)<0 (decreasing 
risk aversion over wealth) or r'(a) >^0 (increasing or constant 
risk aversion over wealth). 
1 1 
SB _ [r(a)+ar' (a)] [D^-k-D^ ( (1-t) r (a) ({)+(1-t) \ (a) ^6) ] > _ 
Given Assumption 3.18, the sign of 9B/9t is in general ambiguous.^ 
1 1 
g r'(a)k[(k-D^)+D ^(l-t)r(a) ((|)+(l-t)r(a)e)] 
r(a)^(a W) 
D ^ [ (1-t) r (a) (xa ^ -pa a k^+kya/) -ka +cr^ > 
+ J" y ^ 2 ]i_>0 (3.24) 
+k ) 
^In the special case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the 
form u(a) = aa3, where 0<g<I, 3B/9t is zero since r(a) + ar'(a) = 0. 
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Both terms of 9B/3X are indeterminate in sign. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the comparative statics analysis 
are minimal. Each partial derivative is formally ambiguous. However, 
under reasonable assumptions about the sizes of the variables in the 
model/ the signs of 9B/9y and may be established as positive 
and negative respectively. Investors with the highest expected 
net income per acre and the lowest variability of that income will 
be favored in the bidding process. These same assumptions lend weight 
to the possibility that 3B/9a^ is positive in sign and 8B/9p is 
negative. The conclusion may be made that a bidding advantage will 
possibly accrue to investors whose original portfolio returns 
have the greatest variability and are the least correlated with land 
income. However, nothing can be said about the signs of 9B/9r(a), 
9B/9k, 9B/9t^ and 9B/9X, even by recourse to the assumptions 3.16 and 
3.18. Thus, the impacts of the investor's degree of risk aversion, 
expected portfolio return, marginal tax rate and net worth on his 
maximum bid cannot be ascertained without further information. 
comments on the Model 
Inspection of Equations 3.12a and 3.12b suggests two imporatnt 
observations with respect to the previous literature on the future 
ownership of farmland. In the first instance, and as recognized in 
^Except of course that 3B/9t = 0 with a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. 
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the development of previous bid-price models, the relationship between 
the per-acre return an investor can expect from farmland and his 
willingness to purchase that land as reflected in a maximum 
bid price is by no means simple except in the case of a zero degree 
of risk aversion (Equation 3.12b). Since it is plausible to 
expect that most investors have some reaction to risk, a bid-
price model taking account of risk aversion (Equation 3.12a) contributes 
to the ability to compare bidding potentials. 
Secondly, the effect of the tax rate is rather difficult to 
e^glore in the case of a nonzero degree of risk aversion unless the 
investor's preferences may be described by a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. In that special case, changes in the tax rate do not 
affect the bid price. This neutral effect of income taxes is consistent 
with the findings of Adams (1976). 
In the case of a nonzero degree of risk aversion, the tax 
effect is more straightforward. As given in Equation (3.12b), the 
investor's marginal income tax rate does not appear in the calculation 
of the bid price. In the absence of risk aversion, the bid price is 
the value of the stream of expected land income, discounted at the 
investor's e:^ected opportunity cost in terms of the return available 
on original portfolio. A high-income bidder's after tax income from 
land will be less than that of a low-income bidder due to the 
progressive structure of federal income tax rates. However, by 
purchasing land, the high income bidder is forgoing some payment 
of taxes at the same higher rate on his alternative sources of asset 
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income, i.e., original portfolio return. 
Thus, if investors are risk neutral, the progressivity of income 
tax rates lends no bidding advantage to low-income bidders unless 
high-income bidders hold a portion of their portfolios in the form 
of tax-exempt municipal bonds. Even if this is the case, we might 
expect that the gross-of-tax return on a portfolio containing 
municipal bonds might be lower than the gross-of-tax return on a 
portfolio without municipals. This is due to the typically 
lower yields found on municipals compared to comparable investments 
because of the tax exempt status of municipal securities. 
Summary 
The specification of the model in Equation 3.3 is derived from 
the previously cited bid-price models of Harris and Nehring and Harris 
and Hampe1. However, in the present formulation, the taxation of 
the opportunity costs of land acquisition is accounted for and the 
investor is assumed to finance the land purchase by the liquidation of 
a cross section of his original portfolio. The specification of the 
variables relating to investor and land characteristics in Equations 
3.12a or 3.12b allows the calculation of an investor's maximum bid-
price for an acre of land. 
On wholly a priori grounds, the qualitative implications of the 
model are ambiguous. Reasonable empirical assumptions shed some 
light on the comparative statics analysis, but even with these 
assumptions a great deal of ambiguity remains. Therefore, a numerical 
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specification of the model is necessary to gain further insight into 
the relationships between the maximum bid price and the variables of 
the model. The next chapter presents, in part, an "empirical 
comparative statics" procedure, the results of which will not be 
as general as those of a more traditional comparative statics ap­
proach. However, the results of the empirical application will 
allow the formation of some tentative conclusions not possible with 
the usual qualitative analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV. A NUMERICAL SPECIFICATION 
OF THE MODEL 
This chapter presents a numerical example of the solution of the 
maximum bid-price model developed in the preceding chapter. The purpose 
of the numerical analysis is to gain an understanding of the relationship 
between each variable of the model and the bid price. 
The maximum bid-price equation. Equation 3.12a, is solved with 
representative or typical values of the variables of the model. The 
impact of the variables on the bid-price is then ascertained by iterating 
each variable around its typical value and noting the resultant change 
in the bid-price solution. This "empirical comparative statics" procedure 
serves as a reasonable if not perfect substitute for the more traditional 
type of qualitative analysis. The results of this numerical analysis 
will not be completely general. However, such results do aid in the 
understanding of bid-price determination since the comparative statics 
section of the preceding chapter demonstrates that unambiguous general 
conclusions do not exist. 
Data Sources 
The numerical analysis in this study is presented as an example 
rather than as a test of the bid-price model. However, because any 
conclusions drawn from a numerical specification of the model must be 
regarded as possibly unique to that particular specification, a close 
correspondence between the data employed and an actual land acquisition 
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process is desirable. Therefore, the gathering of data for this study 
was directed, inasmuch as was practicable, to the context of an in­
vestor considering the purchase of an acre of farmland in Iowa in 
1970. Various data sources were used in an attempt to describe the 
situation confronted by such an investor. The solution of Equation 
3.12a required estimates for y, O^, k, a^, p, x, t, and r(a). 
Expectation and variability of net farm income 
The expected value and standard deviation of per-acre net farm 
income, y and were derived from an annual time series constructed 
for 1965 to 1969. Net farm income per Iowa farm for each year in the time 
series was obtained from the Farm Income Supplement to the 1971 Farm 
Income Situation. These income levels were divided by the average 
number of acres per farm as found in the 1966, 1968 and 1969 issues of 
the Iowa Annual Farm Census to provide a time series of per-acre net 
farm income. On this basis, y was estimated at $31.55 per acre with 
a O of $3.94. 
Expectation and variability of portfolio return 
In order to arrive at estimates for the expected value and standard 
deviation of the rate of return on the investor's portfolio, k and 
it was necessary to construct a hypothetical portfolio. The investors 
portfolio was assumed to be equally divided among long-term United 
States government securities, corporate bonds, preferred stock, and 
common stock. The expected value and standard deviation of the rate 
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of return on portfolio were estimated from a 1955 to 1969 time series 
of overall portfolio returns computed from data on the yields of the 
components of the portfolio obtained from the June, 1970 issue of the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. This procedure resulted in estimates for k 
and of 5.586% and 0-64% respectively. 
Correlation coefficient 
The correlation coefficient between portfolio return and net farm 
income per acre, p, was estimated from the 1965 to 1969 time series 
constructed for per-acre net income and portfolio return. This esti­
mate for p is 0.527.^ 
Net worth 
A measure of the investor's beginning-of-period net worth, x, 
was chosen on the basis of data reported in the study by Harris and 
Nehring (1976). Using the five farm-size categories of the 1969 
Census of Agriculture, Harris and Nehring calculated an average net 
worth for each of the farm-size classes. The levels of net worth 
reported were $234,167 for class 0, $117,489 for class I, $99,953 for 
class II, $98,568 for class III, and $47,616 for class IV. Since 
seventy percent of all Iowa farms fell into classes I, II, and III; 
The use of these estimates for k, 0]^, and p implies that the in­
vestor owns no land, i.e., the decision maker is probably not a farm 
operator. However, iteration analysis may be used to consider different 
values for these variables. Further, these values represent the lower 
limit of the opportunity cost of land acquisition to a land owner with 
knowledge of the capital markets. 
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and since application of the present model is not restricted to in­
vestor's who are farm operators; a net worth of $100,000 was selected 
for the numerical application of this study. Thus, the investor 
envisaged here represents the bulk of the Iowa farming sector, or he 
could be any individual with a net worth of approximately $100,000. 
Marginal tax rate 
The investor's marginal income tax rate, t, was likewise deduced 
from data reported in the Harris and Nehring study. They reported 
marginal income tax rates of 43% for class 0, 32% for class I, 28% for 
class II, 25% for class III,and 24% for class IV. For reasons similar 
to those which led to the selection of the net worth figure, a marginal 
income tax rate of 30% has been used in this study. 
Risk aversion 
A measure of the investor's degree of risk aversion, r(a), requires 
the estimation of the parameters of the investor's utility function. 
As Harris and Nehring note, few studies have reported the estimation of 
utility functions for farm operators. The notable exception is the 
study by Lin, Dean and Moore (1974), in which the utility functions of 
six large-scale California farmers were estimated. Three of these 
estimated functions are quadratic and are characterized by varying 
degrees of risk aversion. Three utility functions of California 
farmers cannot be considered representative of farm and nonfarm in­
vestors in the market for Iowa farmland. However, lacking anything 
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better, for this study the measure of the degree of risk aversion was 
derived from that quadratic utility function reported by Lin, Dean, and 
Moore which exhibits neither the highest or the lowest degree of risk 
aversion ; 
u(A) = 70.01 + 1.30A - 0.0064A^, = .98 (4.1) 
where A represents the investor's after-tax income from original port­
folio measured in thousands of dollars. The risk-aversion function 
was derived by solving Equation 3.6 with the first and second derivatives 
of Equation 4.1 to give 
f 'A'- i.3:g.oLa 
In order to explore the impact of the form of the utility function 
on the relationships between the bid price and the other variables of 
the model, a Cobb-Douglas utility function was also employed. In 
an attempt to isolate the role only of the mathematical form rather 
than the position of the utility function, a Cobb-Douglas function was 
fitted to the scatter of points generated by varying after-tax income 
from $1,000 to $200,000 in Equation 4.1. This procedure resulted in 
the utility function: 
u(A) = 19.267A°'5G95, = .99 (4.3) 
The corresponding risk-aversion function is given by 
r(A) = 0.4105A"^ (4.4) 
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Both utility functions exhibit risk aversion over the entire range. 
However, the quadratic form is characterized by increasing risk aversion 
over income (r'(A)>0), and the Cobb-Douglas function has the property 
of decreasing risk aversion over income (r*(A)<0).^ 
The Impacts of Investor and Land Characteristics 
on Bid Price 
In order to explore the relationships between the variables of the 
model and the investor's maximum bid price for an acre of land, the bid-
price equation derived in the previous chapter. Equation 3.12a, was solved 
using initially the values of the variables discussed in the previous 
section. A solution for the bid price was obtained using both the 
Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function, Equation 4.3, and the 
quadratic form. Equation 4.1. The bid-price solution was $555.10 with 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function and $554.93 using the quadratic version. 
The risk-neutral bid price for the same data set, obtained from Equa­
tion 3.12b, was $554.80. 
After obtaining these solutions for the investor's maximum bid 
price, series of bid-price solutions were obtained by iterating each 
variable from below to above its initial value. As each variable 
ranged about its initial value, all other variables remained fixed at 
]_ 
Again, although the parameters of these utility functions 
describe the preferences of a single California farmer, a wide variety 
of utility functions may be generated from these forms by iteration. 
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their initial values. Summaries of the effects of these iterations on 
the bid price are presented in Table 4.1 for the Cobb-Douglas case and 
Table 4.2 for the quadratic case. In each table, the values for the 
variables discussed previously in the data sources section are listed 
under the "Initial value" column. 
Since the values of the risk-aversion functions depend upon the 
values of x, k. and t, it was not possible to directly vary the value 
of r{A) in rows 8 of Tables 4.1 and 4.2. However, given a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function of the form 
u(A) = OA^, 0<3<1 (4.5) 
and a corresponding risk-aversion function : 
r(A) = (1-8) a"^ (4.6) 
the range of values for r(A) reported in Table 4.1 was computed by 
iterating 3 from 0.9 to 0.1. This shows the effect on the bid price 
of an increase in risk aversion since in Equation 4.6 r(A) is 
inversely related to 3- Similarly, given a quadratic utility function 
of the form 
u(A) = Y + a'A - 3'A^ (4.7) 
with 
r 'M -  '4-9,  
the range of values for r(A) reported in Table 4.2 is the result of 
Table 4.1. Summary of iteration results, Cobb-Douglas utility function^ 
„ . , , Initial _ _ ., . . Range of bid price Percentage change 
value "^"9= Iteration .ere, in bid price 
(1) Portfolio return, Ic 
(percent) 5. 586 to
 
o
 
to 10.0 1,632.04 to 315.48 -80.070 
(2) Net land income, y 
(dollars per acre) 31. 55 20.0 to 80.0 358.21 to 1,438.11 301.471 
(3) Variability of port­
folio return, 
(percent) 0. 64 0 to 3.0 564.79 to 631.13 11.746 
(4) Variability of land 
income, Oy 
(dollars per acre) 3. 94 0 to 25.0 567.86 to 556.35 -2.027 
(5) Correlation 
coefficient, p 0. 52 -1 to 1 571.16 to 564.53 -1.161 
(6) Net worth, x 
(1,000 dollars) 100 50 to 500 566.09 to 566.11 0.004 
(7) Marginal tax rate, t 
(percent) 30 10 to 90 566.10 to 566.10 0 
(8) Risk aversion, r(A) 0. 10498^ 0.02557 to 0.23017° 565.12 to 567.66 0.449 
^here u(A) = cxA^. 
^Given the initial values: a = 19.267, B = 0.5895. 
°These values were derived by varying 3 from 0.9 to 0.1. 
Table 4.2. Summary of iteration results, quadratic utility function^ 
variable Range of iteration Percentage change 
value (dollars per acre) m bid price 
(1) Portfolio return, k 
(percent) 5.586 2.0 to 10.0 1,579.28 to 315.50 -80.023 
(2) Net land income, y 
(dollars per acre) 31.55 20-0 to 80.0 385.05 to 1,432,73 272.089 
(3) Variability of portfolio 
return, o% 
(percent) 0.64 0 to 3.0 564.80 to 570.58 1.023 
(4) Variability of land 
income, a 
(dollars per acre) 3.94 0 to 25.0 565.10 to 563.98 -0.198 
(5) Correlation 
coefficient, p 0.527 -1 to 1 565.42 to 564.78 -0.113 
(6) Net worth, x 
(1,000 dollars) 100 50 to 500 564.87 to 565.56 0.112 
(7) Marginal tax rate, t 
(percent) 30 10 to 90 564.97 to 564.82 -0.027 
(8) Risk aversion, r(A) 0.01024^ 0.00155 to 0.01464^ 564.82 to 644.98 0.028 
^Where u(A) = y + a'A - g'A?. 
^Given the initial values: a' = 1.3, 6" = 0.0064. 
^These values were derived by varying 6' from 0.001 to 0.009. 
42 
iterating 3' from 0.001 to 0.009. This g'-iteration also represents 
an increasing degree of risk aversion. 
The iteration results summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate 
that, using either the Cobb-Douglas on the quadratic utility function, 
the bid price is positively related to: (a) the investor's expec­
tation of net per-acre land income, y; (b) the variability of portfolio 
return, (c) the investor's net worth, X; and (d) the investor's 
degree of risk aversion, r(A). Under the same conditions, the bid-
price is negatively related to: (a) the investor's expectation of 
portfolio return, k; (b) the variability of net per-acre land income, 
CT^; and (c) the correlation coefficient between land income and 
portfolio return, p. As previously noted, the investor's marginal 
income tax rate, t, has no effect on bid-price if his preferences 
are described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The bid-price is 
inversely related to the tax rate if the quadratic utility function 
is used to represent investor preferences. 
A comparison of the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 reveals that 
the form of the utility function employed in the bid-price solution 
can have a noticeable effect on the results of the iteration analysis. 
Since the Cobb-Douglas utility function was derived by fitting a power-
function form to the scatter of points generated by varying the income 
level in the quadratic utility function reported by Lin, Dean, and 
Moore; the two estimated utility functions trace out essentially the 
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same curve in income-utility space over the relevant range.^ Thus, the 
results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 differ chiefly because of the form 
rather than the position of the utility function. In addition to 
the differing results in terms of the impact of the marginal tax 
rate, the use of the Cobb-Douglas utility function results in a greater 
measure of the degree of risk aversion, r(A), than does the quadratic 
form. The initial value of r{A) using the Cobb-Douglas function was 
0.10498. The corresponding figure when the quadratic form was substi­
tuted was 0.01024. This difference in the size of r(A), for a given 
level of its arguments, helps to explain why the iteration results 
of the risk-related variables show a greater impact on bid price in 
Table 4.1 (Cobb-Douglas) than in Table 4.2 (quadratic). The percentage 
changes in the bid price that result from the same iterations for O^, 
Oy, and p under the two utility functions are greater when the Cobb-
Douglas form is used. 
The only variable which shows a stronger impact on the bid 
price using the quadratic as opposed to the Cobb-Douglas utility func­
tion is the investor's net worth, x. This result stems from the fact 
that a quadratic utility function exhibits increasing risk aversion 
over income (r'(A)>0), and a Cobb-Douglas function has the property 
of decreasing risk aversion over income (r'(A)<0). Thus, since the 
1 2 
Recall that Lin, Dean, and Moore reported an R of 0.98 for the 
fit of the quadratic function to the original data and the r2 for the 
Cobb-Douglas fit to the Lin, Dean, and Moore function was 0.99. 
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investor's after-tax income is given by a = xk(l-t), with the quadratic 
utility function, as x is increased from $50,000 to $500,000, the 
degree of risk aversion increases. The same x-iteration leads to à 
reduction in the degree of risk aversion in thé Cobb-Douglas case. 
A careful inspection of the results appearing in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 reveals that they represent a special case in terms of the risk 
relationships of portfolio return and land income. At the initial 
values of the variables of the model, it is apparent that the addition 
of an acre of land to the investor's portfolio reduces his risk 
exposure. With either utility function, an increase in the investor's 
degree of risk aversion (row 8 in both tables) led to an increase in 
the bid price. Rows 6 and 7 of Table 4.2 indicate that an increase 
in net worth or a decrease in the tax rate, both of which imply an 
increase in risk aversion when the quadratic utility function is used, 
also resulted in increased bid prices for land. Further, it may be 
recalled that, given the initial values for all variables of the 
model, the two bid-price solutions corresponding to the two utility 
functions both exceeded the risk-neutral bid price. There is no 
reason to believe that the addition to the investor's portfolio of an 
acre of land might not, under different conditions, increase the 
overall risk exposure of the investor and thus reduce the bid price. 
The effect on the investor's risk exposure of the substitution of an 
acre of land for a cross section of the original portfolio depends 
on the values of k, y, Cf^, and p. Therefore, in order to 
construct a more general example, the variables of the model were 
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varied two at a time. This pairwise iteration procedure allows an in­
vestigation of the impact on bid price of one of the variables under 
varying conditions in terms of another variable. 
The results of the pairwise iterations are summarized in Tables 
4.3 and 4.4 corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas and quadratic utility 
functions respectively. These tables present the percentage changes 
in bid price that resulted from iterating two variables at a time 
around their initial values. As each pair of variables was made to 
move over a specified range, all other variables were fixed at their 
initial values. As was the case for the single iterations, the 3 and 
3* parameters of the two utility functions were varied in a manner which 
simulates an increasing level of risk aversion. Thus, for example, 
the information contained in the third row of the second column of 
Table 4.3 indicates that with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and with 
all variables other than and y fixed at their initial values, the 
following results were found; (a) if y was set at $10, as was 
varied from 0% to 3% the bid price increased by 8.234%, (b) if, 
however, y was set at $80, the bid price showed an increase of 12.664% 
as varied from 0% to 3%. 
The information reported in Tables 4.3 and 4-4 allows a more 
thorough analysis of the impact of each variable on bid price than do 
the results of the single iteration procedure reported in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2. Each row in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows the effect on bid 
price of iterating one of the variables over the indicated range 
given differing conditions in terms of each of the other variables. 
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Table 4.3. Percentage changes in bid price for pairwise iterations, Cobb-Douglas uti! 
Given the values: 
fk 
1% 11% $10 $80 0% 3% $0 $25 -1 1 
_ 1% 
k to -92.023 -92.307 -90.908 -99.779 -92.396 -91.549 -92.605 -92.17 
11% 
_ $10 
y to 733.202 703.522 700.034 732.779 699.961 748.047 687.262 713.22 
$80 
0% 
a, to 4118.757 2.385 8.234 12.664 13.380 3.001 16.479 10.28 
S% 
$0 
to 
•$25 
a -10.952 -1.034 -6.417 -0.792 -0.073 -9.220 3.631 -3.77 
y. 
-1 
p to -6.083 -0.594 -3.633 -0.455 0 -5.322 0 -7.151 
1 
$50 
^to 
$450 
x^ 0.601 0.003 0.006 0.005 .0.004 0.065 0.002 0.115 0.012 0 
10% 
t to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90% 
0.9 
3 to 44.548 -0.035 -0.878 0.816 -0-004 27.281 1.059 -2.950 2.204 -0.09 
0.1 
^In thousands. 
•ons, Cobb-Douglas utility function 
values : 
t e 
$25 -1 1 $50 $450 10% 90% 0.9 0.1 
•91.549 -92.605 -92.172 -92.254 -92.300 -92.280 -92.280 -91.240 -93-942 
?48.047 687.262 713.224 706.907 706.901 706.930 706.930 701.655 715.356 
3.001 16.479 10.280 11.707 11.776 11.746 11.746 2.599 30.240 
3.631 -3.779 -2.089 -1.976 -2.027 -2.027 -0.495 -4.442 
-7.151 -1.154 -1.166 -1.161 -1.161 -0.284 -2.528 
0.115 0.012 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.005 
0 0 
-2.950 2.204 -0.096 0.446 0.451 0.449 0.449 
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Table 4.4. Percentage changes in bid price for pariwise iterations, quadratic utilit 
Given the values: 
fk ^ 
1% 11% $10 $80 0% 3% $0 $25 -1 ] 
_ _ 
k to -90.933 -90.932 -90.909 -91.416 -90.932 -90.934 -90.931 -90. 
11% 
_ $10 
y to 700.566 700.727 699.994 703.084 700.011 704.422 698.718 701. 
$80 
a, to 6.420 0.464 0.715 1.104 1.167 0.262 1.436 0 
3% 
$0 
a to -0.186 -0.206 -0.625 -0.077 -0.007 -0.901 0.354 -0 
^ $25 
— 1 
p to -0.107 -0.118 -0.362 -0.045 0 -0.532 0 -0.719 
1 
$50 
to 
$450 
1.063 -0.021 -0.201 0.193 0 5.120 0.250 -0.664 0.522 -0 
10% 
t  to -0.288 0.007 0.050 -0.047 0 -1.179 -0.060 0.169 -0.127 0 
90% 
0.001 
3'  to  0.317 -0.007 -0.056 0.052 0 1.313 0.067 -0.186 0.140 -0 
0.009 
^In thousands. 
iterations, quadratic utility function 
Given the values: 
O p t 3 ' 
y 
$0 $25 -1 1 $50 $450 10% 90% 0.001 0.009 
-90.932 -90.934 -90.931 -90.932 -90.921 -91.017 -90.939 -90.912 -90.654 -90.942 
700.011 704.422 698.718 701.264 700.330 703.493 700.851 700.084 700.089 700.950 
1.167 0.262 1.436 0.896 0.498 5.643 1.335 0.140 0.154 1.470 
0.354 -0.368 -0.099 -1.010 -0.257 -0.028 -0.030 -0.283 
0 -0.719 -0.057 -0.599 -0.149 -0.016 -0.018 -0.163 
I 0.250 -0.664 0.522 -0.023 0.147 0.012 0.014 0.165 
I -0.060 0.169 -0.127 0-005 -0.012 -0-147 -0.004 -0.037 
0.067 -0.186 0.140 -0.005 0.014 0.165 0.037 0.004 
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In many cases, the intensity and direction of the impact of a variable on 
bid price was found to depend on the form of the utility function and 
on the values of the other variables of the model. 
Expected portfolio return 
The iteration from 1% to 11% of the investor's expectation of the 
rate of return on portfolio, k, represents a change in the expected 
opportunity cost of land acquisition. This increase in k had a potent 
negative impact on bid price regardless of either the form of the 
utility function or the values of the other variables of the model. 
Expected net income from land 
The iteration from $10 to $80 of the investor's expectation of 
net per-acre land income had a strong positive effect on bid price 
regardless of the form of the utility function or the values of the 
other variables of the model. 
Variability of portfolio return 
The impact on bid price of varying the standard deviation of port­
folio return, (T^, was positive under all conditions. However, the 
size of the percentage change in bid price resulting from the all­
iteration depended on the form of the utility function used, and on the 
levels of the other variables. In general, the impact of varying cr^ 
on bid-price was greater in the Cobb-Douglas case (Table 4.3) than 
in the quadratic case (Table 4.4). A similar result was noted in the 
discussion of the single iteration procedure. 
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Using the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the effect on bid price 
of a ceteris paribus increase in cfj^ from 0% to 3% was: 
a) stronger with k set at 1% than with k set at 11%. For a given 
range of iteration of the lower the value of k, the greater 
is the change in the riskiness of portfolio return implied 
by that a^-iteration. Thus, the strength of the impact of a 
given iteration of on bid price varies inversely with the 
value of k. 
b) stronger when y was set at $80 than when y was $10. For a 
given increase in 0^, the lower the relative riskiness of 
land income, the greater is the impact of the increase in 
on bid price. Since the pairwise iterations of and y were 
performed with 0^ set at its initial value of $3.94, the 
higher value of y implies a lower coefficient of variation 
for land income. Thus, increasing the value of y strengthens 
the impact of 0^ on bid price. 
c) stronger when 0^ was set at $0 than when 0^ was set equal 
to $25. The greater the coefficient of variation for net 
land income, i.e., the larger the value of 0^ with y fixed, 
the weaker is the impact of 0^ on bid price. 
d) stronger with p equal to -1 than with p equal to 1. With y 
and 0^ set at their initial values, an increase in the 
correlation coefficient lessens the ability of a land 
acquisition to reduce the overall risk exposure of the 
investor. Therefore, the effect on the 0^-iteration of an 
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increase in p is analogous to the effect of an increase in 
the relative riskiness of land income. Increasing the value 
of p reduces the impact on bid price of a change in a^. 
e) about the same when x was $50,000 as when x was $450,000. 
f) unaffected by changing the value of t. 
f) stronger with a 3 of 0.1 than with a 3 of 0.9. The greater 
the investor's degree of risk aversion, the stronger is his 
reaction to an increase in cr^. 
The corresponding results of varying using the quadratic utility 
function were similar to Cobb-Douglas case except for the impacts of 
net worth and the tax rate. Using the quadratic utility function, 
the effect on bid price of increasing rom 0% to 3% was: 
a) stronger with x equal to $450,000 than with x equal to 
$50,000. Since the quadratic form of the utility function 
implies that the investor is increasingly risk averse over 
income, he reacts more sharply to increased portfolio risk 
at high as opposed to low net worth levels. 
b) stronger with t set at 10% than with t set at 90%. Since the 
investor's after-tax income is inversely related to the tax 
rate, and risk aversion is directly related to after-tax 
income, the investor's degree of risk aversion and his marginal 
tax rate are inversely related. Thus, increasing t reduces the 
investor's response to the increase in cr^. 
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Variability of per-acre net farm income 
The effect on bid price of increasing the standard deviation of 
net land income, was negative under all conditions except when 
the correlation coefficient was negative. Using the Cobb-Douglas form 
of the utility function, the impact on bid price of a ceteris paribus 
increase in from $0 to $25 was: 
a) stronger with k equal to 1% than with k equal to 11%. Since 
was fixed as its initial value of 0-64% during the pairwise 
iteration of and k, the lower value of k corresponds to a 
greater coefficient of variation for portfolio return. The 
investor's response to an increase in CT^ is more intense, 
the lower the value of k, i.e., the greater the relative 
riskiness of portfolio return.. 
b) stronger with y set at $10 than with y set at $80. For a 
given increase in cr^, the lower the value of y, the wider 
is the range of riskiness of land income implied by that in­
crease in CTy. Therefore, the strength of the investor's reac­
tion to a change in is inversely related to the value of y. 
c) stronger when cf^ was 3% than when was 0%. The greater the 
riskiness of portfolio return, the more intense is the in­
vestor's reaction to a change in o^. 
d) positive when p was set at -1 and negative when p was equal to 
1. With a negative correlation coefficient, the ability of 
the addition of an acre of land to portfolio to reduce the 
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investor's risk exposure is positively related to the 
variability of land income. With a positive value for p, 
however, an increase in increases the investor's overall 
risk exposure with land added to portfolio. Thus, the 
change in bid price resulting from an increase in will be 
opposite in sign to p. 
e) about the same regardless of whether the investor's net worth 
was $50,000 or $450,000.. 
f) unaffected by the tax rate,. 
g) stronger with a 3 of 0.1 than with a 8 of 0.9. The intensity 
of the investor's response to an increase in is positively 
related to his degree of risk aversion. 
The differential impacts of the a^-iteration on bid price using 
the quadratic utility function were similar to, although less severe 
than the Cobb-Douglas case with the exception of the variables x, 
k, and t. The increasing risk aversion over income property of the 
quadratic utility function accounts for the dissimilarity of the 
effects of k and x on the investor's reaction to an increase in 
using the Cobb-Douglas and quadratic utility functions. The effect 
of the a^-iteration on bid price using the quadratic function was 
iiore intense with t at 10% than with t at 90%. This tax effect also 
resulted from the fact that a higher after-tax income level results 
in a greater degree of risk aversion in the quadratic case. 
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Correlation coefficient 
The impact of the correlation coefficient, p, on bid price was 
negative under all conditions unless either or was set equal to 
zero. When O, or G was set equal to zero, a change in p had no ef-K y 
feet on bid-price. The effects of the other variables and the utility 
functions on the strength of the relationship between p and bid price 
are analogous to their impacts on the relationship between and 
bid price discussed in the preceding subsection. 
Investor's net worth 
The impacts on bid price of the investor's net worth, x, were 
zero or positive but negligible when the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
was employed. Using the quadratic utility function, the effects on 
bid price of an increase in x were more varied- The impact on bid 
price of an increase in x from $50,000 to $450,000 using the quadratic 
utility function was: 
a) positive k was 1%, y was $80, a was 3%, o was 0, and p 
Jc y 
was -1. All of these results indicate that x is positively 
related to bid price under conditions of a high relative 
riskiness of portfolio return. As x increases, the degree 
of risk aversion increases with the quadratic form of the 
utility function. 
b) nonpositive when k was 11%, y was $10, was 0%, was $25, 
and p was 1. These cases all represent situations in which 
the addition of an acre of land to portfolio is likely to 
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increase the investor's risk exposure. 
c) positive but minor given either the upper or lower values of 
t and 3 *• 
Marginal tax rate 
As previously noted, the value of the investor's marginal income 
tax rate, t, has no effect on bid price if the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function is used. Using the quadratic utility function, the effects 
of the other variables on the relationship between t and bid price 
were opposite in sign to the corresponding effects on the relation­
ship between x and bid price discussed in the previous subsection. As 
the investor's degree of risk aversion is directly related to x, it 
is inversely related to t. Thus, as t was increased from 10% to 
90%, the signs of the bid-price changes were the opposite of the 
corresponding changes obtained by increasing x from $50,000 to $450,000. 
The degree of risk aversion 
The impacts on bid price of varying the 3 and 3' parameters of the 
Cobb-Douglas and quadratic utility functions respectively were similar 
in sign to the corresponding impacts discovered when net worth was 
increased using the quadratic utility function. Thus, the changes 
in bid price that resulted from varying 3 from 0.9 to 0.1 and 3' from 
0.001 to 0.009 had the same signs as the corresponding changes in bid 
price that resulted from increasing x from $50,000 to $450,000 in the 
quadratic case. This finding is explained by the fact that an increase 
in X with the quadratic utility function implies an increase in the 
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degree of risk aversion, and the 3 and 3' parameters were varied in 
such a way as to indicate increasing risk aversion. 
Summary 
A numerical specification of the bid-price model was necessary to 
explore the relationships between the bid-price and the variables of 
the model. Various data sources were used in an attempt to describe 
as accurately as possible an actual land acquisition situation. The 
measures of the variability of portfolio return and land income, and 
respectively, estimated for this study probably understate the risks 
faced by an individual investor. Since was estimated from a time 
series of the Iowa average of per-acre net farm incomes, the variability 
of per-acre income encountered by individual farming units probably 
exceeds the estimate for a . The estimate for a, was derived from 
y k 
the annual average of returns on all securities for each of the four 
components of the hypothetical portfolio. Since the return on each 
component in the portfolio is the average of returns on all similar 
securities in the United States for any year, the variability of the 
returns of the components of a portfolio held by an individual investor 
is likely to lead to a variability of portfolio return greater than 
the estimate for derived from national averages. Since one of the 
contributions of a bid-price model is to account for risk in the explana­
tion of an investor's valuation of an asset, conservative estimates 
for 0 and were appropriate in order not to overstate the case. 
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The impacts of the variables of the model oti bid price were in­
vestigated- With the exception of expected portfolio return, k, and 
expected land income, y, the effect of each variable on bid price 
was found to depend primarily on (a) the form of the utility function 
and (b) the relative riskiness of land income and portfolio return. 
The variables k and y had strong impacts on bid price regardless of 
other considerations. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Future developments in the ownership structure of United States 
farmland may have far reaching implications for both the farming 
industry and rural society. Under the assumption that farm ownership 
in the future is likely to be vested in those individuals or corpo­
rations who are currently willing to pay the highest price for farm­
land, a per-acre maximum bid-price model for farmland may serve as a 
useful tool in addressing the future ownership question. 
Past statistical studies have suggested the variables that in­
fluence farmland valuation. However, these studies have tended to 
summarize the operation of entire markets rather than relating the 
important variables to individual investor decisions. Research in­
vestigating the future firm-size structure of the farming industry 
has identified factors that might provide differing incentives to 
ownership to investors in various farm-size classes. The quanti­
tative development of such research has been limited, however, to com­
parisons of rates of return obtained by various farm-size classes. 
Such comparisons of rates of return cannot be translated into 
comparisons of the willingness to purchase land without considering 
the ramifications of asset risk and investor risk aversion. Developers 
of bid-price models have attempted an integration of the various factors 
impinging upon land valuation, including asset risk and risk aversion, 
into a comprehensive measure of the willingness to purchase farmland. 
However, these bid-price models are limited in applicability and suffer 
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in the forms of their original specification. 
A generalized maximum bid-price model was developed in this study. 
An investor's maximum bid for an acre of farmland was related to 
variables describing the land under consideration and the investor's 
initial situation. These variables are; expectation and variability 
of the rate of return on investor's original portfolio, expectation 
and variability of net per-acre farm income, the correlation between 
portfolio return and net land income, investor's net worth, investor's 
marginal income tax rate, and investor's degree of risk aversion. 
After constructing the maximum bid-price model, a comparative statics 
evaluation of the effects of the variables on bid price was pursued. 
Since the comparative statics conclusions were rather ambiguous, 
a numerical specification of the model was provided to further explore 
the relationships between bid price and the variables of the model. 
The data collection for this numerical application was conducted in 
such a manner as to fairly accurately reflect an actual land acquisi­
tion situation in Iowa. However, since no estimated utility functions 
for Iowa farmers were found, two forms of the utility function of a 
large-scale California farmer were used. The results of the numerical 
specification suggest that, in addition to net per-acre farm income and 
rate of return on portfolio, the relative riskiness of these two 
returns and the form of the investor's utility function are the most 
important sources of bid-price variation. 
This study was intended to provide a general exposition of the 
construction and characteristics of a bid-price model rather than an 
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application to a particular facet of the future ownership issue. How­
ever, the results of the numerical application of the model suggest an 
interesting hypothesis. An important source of bid-price variation 
was found to stem from the impact of the addition of land to 
the portfolio on the investor's risk exposure. The influence of a 
land purchase on risk exposure was found to be greater when the 
variabilities of land and portfolio returns differed, and when the 
correlation between these two returns was less than perfect. The re­
sults of this study therefore suggest that, other things being equal, 
investor's who hold a diversified portfolio are likely to enjoy a 
bidding advantage over investor's whose wealth is held largely in 
the form of farmland similar to that under consideration. 
The applicability of the bid-price model developed in this study 
is perhaps limited because of the sensitivity of the bid-price solution 
to the form and parameters of the investor's utility function. For the 
model to be relevant to the consideration of a particular facet of the 
ownership issue, say the farm-size aspect, it would be necessary that 
either; (a) a single robust utility function could be estimated for 
all farm-size classes, or (b) a reliable utility function corresponding 
to each farm-size class could be obtained. Because of the current 
paucity of research that reports estimated utility functions, this 
question of the applicability of the bid-price model must remain at 
issue. 
Results of the model indicate the importance of various areas of 
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economic research. In addition to the estimation of utility func­
tions, a respecification of the model to capture the sophistica­
tion of the financing of land purchases would be useful. The present 
model requires the assumption that land purchases are financed by 
the liquidation of a cross section of the investor's initial port­
folio. As such, the model is not directly applicable to investors 
whose entire wealth is held in the form of farmland. The reformula­
tion of the model to allow the consideration of portfolio growth through 
debt and equity issuance would obviate this problem. 
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